What was the demographic situation in Ukraine before the full-scale Russian invasion and how has it changed over three years of the great war? How many Ukrainians are currently in territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, abroad, and under occupation? What portion of Ukrainian refugees can be expected to return and how can Ukrainians be encouraged to stay in their homeland? What population size does Ukraine need for development, including economic development? Should labor migrants from other countries be attracted and why? How should regions affected by hostilities be rebuilt after the war? When will it be necessary to conduct a nationwide population census? All this and much more was discussed in conversations with journalists from the Ukrainian Radio station and the online publications Rubryka and TSN.ua by the Deputy Director for Scientific Affairs of the Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, Oleksandr Hladun. “...the demographic situation now primarily depends on the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The sooner they win, the better it will be both for the country and for the demographic situation,” the scientist asserts.
About the demographic situation in Ukraine on the eve of the great war and its causes:
“The demographic situation in Ukraine was difficult even before the full-scale invasion. It should also be taken into account that we had COVID in 2020 and 2021. In 2021, mortality from COVID ranked second among causes of death — 12.3% of deaths were directly related to COVID.
If we talk about long-term trends in general, the maximum population of Ukraine was in 1993 — 52.2 million. At the start of the full-scale invasion within the 1991 borders, i.e., including Crimea and ORDLO, our Institute estimated the population at 42 million. So, practically over 30 years, the population decreased by 10 million. These are very high rates of population decline, although the country was living and developing.”
“[Currently] the population on the territory under control is estimated at approximately 29 million, with a margin of error of plus or minus 1 million. In our difficult conditions, this is quite an acceptable margin of error. More or less this figure corresponds to reality.”
“The population decline occurred due to three factors that shape the population size.
The first is a decrease in birth rates and relatively high mortality. In particular, Ukraine has a high rate of premature mortality compared to European countries. We have a very large share of deaths under the age of 65.”
“...the sharp decline in birth rates... was caused by historical trends characteristic of almost all countries worldwide. In Europe, birth rates also do not compensate for mortality, but this process is stretched over 50-70 years. In Ukraine, the decline in birth rates happened very rapidly immediately after gaining independence, although it is not directly related to it. There was an economic crisis and a change in the reproductive attitudes of the population. This is a global trend. <…> ...to avoid population decline, 100 women must give birth to 210-220 children. This depends on the mortality situation in the country. In Ukraine in 2021, which was a COVID year that also affected birth rates, 100 women gave birth to 116 children. That is twice less than needed. At the same time, in South Korea, which has no war, 100 women gave birth to 70 children. In China, 100 women of reproductive age give birth to 100 children. In Japan and Italy — 120 children. According to our estimates during the war, 100 women give birth to approximately 90-95 children. <…>
The second factor is very high excess mortality among men of working age (from 20 to 60 years), with life expectancy about 7-10 years less than in European Union countries. The gap between life expectancy of men and women in Ukraine is 10 years, whereas in leading European countries it is 2-3 years.”
The third factor is so-called labor migration. Initially, it was pendulum migration — people traveled to work in European countries or Russia and then returned. Over time, people settled there, found permanent jobs and housing, and began to stay. According to expert estimates after the 2001 census, between 1 and 2.5 million of our compatriots remained abroad. So, according to the records, they were supposedly counted in Ukraine’s population, but in fact were absent.”
About Ukrainians abroad and under occupation:
“...the number of our citizens abroad is exclusively an estimate by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. According to their latest data, 6.9 million of our citizens are abroad. But we consider this figure quite overstated by about 2 million. Let me explain why. We compared these figures with data from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. They do not confirm the figure of 7 million but indicate a significantly smaller number. Of course, the border guards may have undercounted, especially in the first weeks after the start of the war in 2022 when they could not process everyone, but a difference of 2 million is very large.
By the way, we already have experience communicating with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In 2023, we analyzed their data. Then the UN named a figure close to 8 million of our citizens abroad. We stated that these figures were overstated, and within two months they agreed with the comment and lowered their estimate by 2 million. <…> ...UNHCR staff do not conduct their own accounting. They take data from certain services in each country responsible for receiving and registering our forced migrants. Ukrainians fleeing the war were allowed to move freely across all countries of the world and Europe. Therefore, it is quite possible that such discrepancies in figures arise due to double counting — when people are registered in one country but have already moved to another and registered there. For some reason, they were not deregistered in the previous country or this happens with a significant delay. In addition, it is quite possible that some of our citizens who illegally worked in Europe before the war have now decided to legalize their status in the country of residence. So this number of 6.9 million, like all numbers now, requires quite a critical assessment. <…>
Regarding the occupied territories, it is currently very difficult to estimate the number of our citizens in the territory uncontrolled by Ukraine. We more or less know the population in Crimea. It is approximately 2.4 million citizens — the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. But this excludes Russian military personnel, as we do not know exactly how many are there. It is very difficult to accurately estimate the number of residents in other territories uncontrolled by Ukraine. According to our estimates, between 1.2 and 2.5 million people live there. But the question arises: are these people Ukrainian citizens or those brought there by the Russians? We know that Russia is currently conducting an active policy of demographic capture of Ukrainian territories, i.e., transporting its citizens to occupied cities. How should they be counted? They are supposedly on Ukrainian territory, but on the other hand, they are Russian citizens. By the way, after liberation of these territories, they will need to be deported back to Russia.”
About depopulation and labor migration:
“The thing is, there is no population size that is critically needed by any country. We know that there are many countries with populations of 10, 20, or 30 million. Ukraine also had a decent population size by European standards before the full-scale invasion. So the problem may lie elsewhere — that we have the largest territory among European countries. And the territory should be, as they say, ‘managed,’ and the population should be more or less evenly distributed across this territory. This can cause problems where some areas will be unattended, without people. Therefore, it is worth saying that the placement of the population after the war will be an important issue. Which destroyed cities to rebuild and which not? What to do with border areas, whether to create a buffer zone of 20-30 km there? These issues will need to be resolved after the war, taking into account the realities we will have.
Also, after the war ends, it will be necessary to wait a year or two to see how many people return from abroad. We definitely should not cling to our demographic past. It is time to forget that we had 50 or 40 million — this will not be the case in the near future. We need to assume that we will have approximately 25-30 million and plan economic development, infrastructure restoration, social policy, including population resettlement, accordingly. This number should be the focus and certain social, demographic, and economic policy measures should be taken to stabilize this population size. The thing is, in most European countries and many countries worldwide, the population is currently declining due to natural causes. That is, birth rates are lower than mortality.”
“Many cities and settlements have been destroyed by the enemy. I doubt that this territory will turn into a ‘Mongolian wasteland.’ Many IDPs [internally displaced persons] already state that they would like to return to their previous places of residence, but they face huge problems with housing. I do not think these enemy-damaged places will be heavily populated in the post-war period. Before the war, urbanization was taking place in these regions, and the rural population was gradually decreasing. Employment in agriculture also decreased due to increased labor productivity. So, on one hand, we have an objective process, and on the other, the consequences of hostilities. <…> It is necessary to work more actively with IDPs to find out whether they want to return to their previous places of residence or not. And if we refer to the economy, in case of labor shortages, population movement to these regions should be stimulated. <…> It cannot be that a huge territory in Ukraine remains empty — this is the wrong policy in population settlement. There are many questions. Most of them will be resolved after the war ends, although it is worth thinking about them now.”
“During the war, it is probably possible to attract migrants from certain countries under contract for certain jobs. Will all return after the contract ends? Unlikely. <…> Many Ukrainians who illegally came to European countries without permanent residence permits already have them and stay there. So it should be understood that many migrants will remain in Ukraine one way or another. At the same time, we should consider that after the war ends, there will be demobilization, and some people will still return from abroad. And here there is a risk that jobs will be occupied. So we will be talking not about a labor shortage but about a labor surplus. <…> ...conducting... an active migration policy, involving a large number of foreigners, in my opinion, is the wrong path. We still need to focus on developing our own citizens and the country. Birth rates probably will not rise to a high level very quickly, but it can be increased to a certain level. It is necessary to work on increasing the duration and quality of life of our own population, involve more older age groups in the labor market. Create conditions for motherhood and fatherhood — flexible work schedules, wages, assistance, and so on. So hoping that foreigners will fundamentally improve the situation, I would not.”
About difficulties and ways to improve the demographic situation through birth rates:
“Many factors influence the decision to have children. And in each family, it is formed differently. If we take the results of studies before the full-scale invasion and in the pre-COVID period, a young Ukrainian family aimed at having two children. But now, in fact, the one-child family model prevails.
All surveys give approximately the same result regarding factors influencing the decision on the number of children. This is the economic factor — the level of wages. Raising a child is very expensive now. Then housing. If there are no decent housing conditions, they may dare to have the first child but not the second. Women also say they need a flexible work schedule. And not only at their workplace but also so that preschool institutions work flexibly. So that a mother can leave a child for a few hours when it is convenient for her, and so on. Then the issue of social infrastructure. And in general, the attitude toward having children, family policy. There is research showing that if after the birth of the first child the family faced significant economic difficulties, the likelihood of deciding to have a second child decreases. If the birth of the first child went well in all respects, then the likelihood that the family will have a second child increases.
Of these three components (migration, mortality, birth rate) — this is the most difficult topic. It is difficult to make a single decision that would promote an increase in birth rates. During the war, it is hardly possible to do anything because the security factor is paramount. But after the war, I believe that if the state policy is properly conducted, we can reach the average European level or even higher. But it must be a comprehensive policy.”
About the next nationwide population census:
“The last and only population census in Ukraine was conducted on December 5, 2001. According to UN recommendations, a census should be conducted every 10 years. Annual population estimates are made based on censuses. However, over time, the accuracy of these estimates decreases. Therefore, 10 years is considered a sufficient compromise between loss of accuracy and the costs of conducting a census. A population census is the most complex procedure on a national scale. Organizing a census is more difficult than holding elections. The census was planned for 2011, then postponed to 2012. In 2013, forms were even printed and personnel prepared, but it was postponed again. The next census can be conducted a year or two after the war ends, when migration flows stabilize. Then it will be appropriate to conduct a population census.”