Monograph "Information and Communication Environment of Ukraine in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Strategies and Practices to Counter Destructive Influences"

At the I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, a monograph by the deputy director for scientific work of this institution, head of the Department of Political Culture and Ideology, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Yuriy Nikolayets, has been published: "The Information and Communication Environment of Ukraine in the Conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Strategies and Practices to Counter Destructive Influences," prepared based on the results of the research work "The Russian-Ukrainian War as a Conflict of Identities, Values, and Ideologies." The publication highlights the participation of the state and civil society in countering destructive informational influences in the context of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war. The study aimed to test several hypotheses, namely: about the increasing role of informational confrontation in modern warfare and preparation for armed confrontation; about the changing role of centralized communication models in the conditions of modern informational warfare; about the growing role of influencers in informational confrontation; about the possibility of initiating destructive informational influences by both the authorities and the opposition within the framework of internal political struggle during wartime. The author applied an interdisciplinary approach, combining, among other methods, content analysis, critical discourse analysis, case study analysis, comparative and correlational analyses. As the author notes, the information and communication environment of Ukraine in the conditions of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is developing under the influence of digitalization with its open information space, which has become an arena of confrontation among leading world countries. One of the means of such confrontation is the spread of destructive informational influences — the organized and purposeful use of informational tools and technologies to harm the object of influence: human behavior and mental state, social harmony, national security. The main goal of destructive informational influences is to reformat the consciousness of individuals, social groups, and society to worsen the moral and psychological state, manipulate public opinion, spread panic moods, or induce certain actions or inaction. Destructive informational influences are implemented through the dissemination of false or distorted information to mislead; distortion of facts; use of emotional content to form desired narratives; targeted spread of ideas and views to influence consciousness and behavior; dissemination of media content capable of worsening emotional and psychological states; implementation of special measures to change the behavior of the target audience. The main tasks of destructive informational influence include: - Manipulating public consciousness and citizens' political orientations; - Destabilizing society by misleading the population about the work of state authorities, law enforcement, and judicial bodies; - Provoking social, political, interethnic, and interfaith conflicts; - Discrediting the country's historical policy with the reformatting of national memory; - Undermining the state's influence on the international stage, its defense capability, and combat potential, including by sowing citizens' distrust in the ability to organize an adequate response to the enemy; - Creating prerequisites for crises in the economy, supply of the armed forces with necessary weapons and military equipment, mobilization, etc. Confrontation in the information space generates various forms of informational manipulation and destructive influences that threaten the destruction of large social communities, states, peoples, and nations. At the same time, the possibilities of manipulation significantly increase if society lacks key cultural, civic, and national cognitive frameworks and behavioral patterns that are established in the process of state-building and strengthened with state support. In the 21st century, due to the accelerated development of information and communication technologies, the capabilities for implementing destructive informational influences have sharply increased, becoming a significantly more important component of preparation and conduct of hostilities than before. The combination of hybrid sabotage using special operations forces units, cognitive warfare, cyberattacks, special informational-psychological operations, economic pressure, interference in elections, instrumentalization of migration, manipulation of energy supplies, and influence through the diaspora aims to minimize the use of regular armies to achieve specific foreign policy goals. Moreover, destructive informational influences can be used to provoke crises in the functioning of various international organizations, including blocking their decisions aimed at stopping aggressive actions. Modern means of forming, disseminating, and processing information enable targeted informational influences using the Internet and new communication tools (smartphones, personal computers, etc.). Today, the capabilities of messengers, video hosting platforms, and social networks allow targeting information not only to user groups but also to individuals based on their preferences through psychological profiling and identification of individual preferences. Over the past few years, the possibilities for spreading destructive informational influences have sharply increased due to artificial intelligence systems. Under such conditions, cyberspace has become a full-fledged theater of military operations. Pressure on the information field of a particular state, as well as influence on the individual informational fields of its citizens, can disorient them in identifying threats and enemies, foster separatist sentiments, encourage citizens to refuse participation in organizing resistance to enemy invasion, and even join combat on the side of the aggressor. Confrontation in the information space no longer merely "serves" the confrontation on the battlefield, as it did before, but also determines certain aspects of it and influences political decision-making. Destructive informational influences aim to destroy social capital, as society during war survives thanks to mutual assistance and solidarity. The challenge remains to outline an adequate response to such influences. In Ukraine, conditions facilitating the enemy's implementation of destructive influences in the information and communication environment were formed over a long period. The position of the Ukrainian state allowed the free spread of Russian propaganda narratives in the Ukrainian media space. The most effective countermeasures against the spread of hostile destructive informational influences were taken during the full-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine. The organization of the volunteer movement, volunteer battalions, and coordination of citizens' efforts to repel the enemy's attack were significantly influenced by the expansion of horizontal connections in society. Strengthening such connections during the full-scale war demonstrated the absence of a "split in Ukraine" and the readiness of the majority of citizens to defend their country. At the same time, horizontal connections significantly accelerated civil society's response to various challenges, which was especially noticeable in 2022. Moreover, during the war, it became clear that Ukrainian society usually reacts negatively to attempts to impose certain ideas or beliefs. According to the author of the monograph, countering destructive informational influences can be achieved not only by forming and spreading counter-discourse. Positive results can also be attained through other measures, including political and/or economic reforms, adherence to legislation on the state language, which is an important tool for forming and preserving the state's information space, as well as successful and timely actions by special services. At the same time, such actions must be based on an effective legal framework that meets contemporary requirements and contains norms aimed at protecting the information and communication environment defined within the relevant doctrine. The scholar provides examples of successful counteraction to hostile destructive informational influences. According to him, cooperation between several bloggers and certain state bodies contributed to spreading skepticism about the assessment of the Russian army as the "second army in the world," as well as refuting the claim that "Russia does not abandon its own." Successful were projects by Ukrainian bloggers who, with state support, had the opportunity to show the true face and moods of Russian prisoners of war. The dissemination of information about the motives and moods of Ukrainian collaborators, who did not hesitate to adjust enemy strikes on Ukrainian cities, was also important. To increase the socio-mobilization potential of state informational policy, as writes Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Yuriy Nikolayets, content about the prospects and nature of post-war reconstruction oriented towards implementing innovative projects, modernizing economic activities and business-government relations, and deepening comprehensive ties between the country's regions should be disseminated. It is important to emphasize that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have experience in successful actions in a war whose scale is the largest since World War II, as well as achievements in destroying a significant part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and organizing strikes deep into Russian territory. Given the prospect of prolonged hostilities with continued confrontation in the information space for an indefinite period (most likely, such confrontation will continue as long as the Russian Federation exists), countering hostile destructive informational influences requires honesty, as constant promises to end the war and manipulations around the conditions for ceasing hostilities cause disappointment among citizens, while honest conversations about difficulties, the prolonged nature of the war, and real threats mobilize mature society much better. Mobilizing society also involves defining clear action algorithms instead of abstract appeals. Informational policy should ensure the dissemination of information about available vacancies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, participation in fundraising for the army's needs, courses in first aid and basic general military training, etc. Communication around mobilization should be built on respect, a professional approach, and the possibility of choosing a specialty according to one's profession, forming perceptions of the army as a modern technological structure that values soldiers' lives. A citizen must understand that in the army they will be effectively trained, and their civilian skills will be used to maximum benefit, with respect. Campaigns of living stories are important, implemented through narratives about specific people: stories of volunteers, civilian specialists retrained as drone operators, or entrepreneurs who organized the production of goods important for the front. Society must be consolidated around the idea that success in the war against the Russian Federation primarily means preserving Ukrainian statehood and the country's further democratic development. In informational policy, it is necessary to avoid aggressive pressure and hate speech within society, including through the search for "culprits" among one's own, ignoring important problems (corruption or command mistakes), as this reduces trust in official sources and can contribute to creating the illusion that the war concerns only those on the front line. It is also necessary to raise the professional level of expert discussions, which should focus on substantive debates about current state-building problems. This will reduce the amount of manipulative information in the information field and counteract the creation of fake "points of tension" in society. Given the prospect of continued threats from the Russian Federation, it is necessary to form conviction about the appropriateness of ensuring total resistance to aggression with awareness of each citizen's role in such resistance. At the same time, it is important to demonstrate that rules and duties during wartime are the same for everyone, regardless of wealth, status, or position. Russia actively uses and will continue to use Ukraine's internal problems (corruption scandals, mobilization shortcomings, labor shortages, etc.) to turn lines of demarcation in Ukrainian society into lines of division. Countering destructive informational influences in this context must involve proactive actions — with quick acknowledgment of one's own mistakes, punishment of the guilty, and publication of a clear official position to avoid leaving a vacuum for rumors that the enemy will inevitably exploit. The organization of counteraction to destructive informational influences must consider the need to ensure targeted communication. For youth, TikTok formats and public statements by influencers seem more appropriate; for business — clear economic arguments and rules of the game that are the same for everyone and prevent unfair competition; for the older generation — classic media. The most important code of Ukraine's information field was and remains the Ukrainian language. Therefore, the state must make significant efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian-language segment with an emphasis on "soft power" and encouragement. Bibliographic description Nikolayets Yu. O. The Information and Communication Environment of Ukraine in the Conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Strategies and Practices to Counter Destructive Influences: Monograph. Kyiv: I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, 2026. 152 pages. FULL ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THE MONOGRAPH According to information from the I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies of the NAS of Ukraine